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Secondary offering is one of the most important methods of acquiring follow-up 
capital for listed companies. In recent years, the use of secondary offerings becomes 
more and more popular, and it triggers the phenomenon of “fashion of further issue” 
and “fashion of shares allotment”. However, CSRC requires the accounting 
performance of listed companies, planning to refund, to reach certain rigid standards, 
which to some extent motivates them to manage the earnings in order to meet the 
standard. Against the special institution background of our country, the strong control 
of large shareholder is a feature of listed companies, and it gives the chance of large 
shareholder tunneling. When incentive and opportunity both appear, the large holder 
may help listed companies refund through earnings management and then tunnels the 
refunded capital by various means. 
This article chooses A-Share listed companies with secondary offering, including 
further issuing and shares allotment, on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
during the period of 2001-2004 as sample, regards related party transaction as the 
proxy of earnings management, and examines the incentive of earnings management 
in secondary offering of listed companies from the perspective of tunneling of large 
shareholder. Our major conclusions through the empirical analysis are as follow: （1）
before secondary offering, listed companies increase sales revenue through related 
party transaction to manage earnings, and related party transaction could help rising 
the premium of refunding, however the complexity of pricing makes the high 
premium do not significantly exist; （2）the more parent companies manage profit of 
listed companies by related party transaction, the more tunneling behavior will happen 
in the days to come, which means tunneling is the incentive for earnings management 
during the secondary offering process; （3） the stock market’s reaction is negative 
















transaction, which demonstrates the failure of investors to perceive earnings 
management before secondary offering and tunneling after. 
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